10.18452/3361
Lengwiler, Yvan
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Auctions and Corruption
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
2000
auctions
procurement
corruption
collusion
coalitions
330 Wirtschaft
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
2017-06-15
2017-06-15
2005-09-23
2000-05-01
http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/series/sfb-373-papers/2000-40/PDF/40.pdf
http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4013
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047498
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses